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et al.: Free Exercise of Religion

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
N.Y. CON s. art.I, § 3:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed in this state to all mankind ... but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this state.
U.S. CONST. amend. I:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, orprohibitingthefree exercise thereof....
SUPREME COURT
ROCKLAND COUNTY
Rockland Psychiatric Center v. Virginia G. 1
(decided October 11, 1995)

Respondent, a diagnosed schizophrenic and a patient of
petitioner, a psychiatric hospital, refused to take psychotropic
medication because of her alleged belief in the Christian Science

faith. 2 Petitioner sought a court order to authorize involuntary
medication of respondent, who asserted that the Free Exercise
Clauses of the New York State3 and Federal Constitutions 4
1. 634 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1995).
2. Id.at 649.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. This section provides in pertinent part:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this
state to all mankind... but the liberty of conscience hereby secured
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.
Id.
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ." Id. The court noted that under the
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protected her right to refuse the medication. 5 The Supreme
Court, Rockland County, rejected the constitutional challenge,
finding that respondent offered no evidence that her current
religious beliefs prohibited the taking of such medication, due to
the fact that she had not practiced Christian Science in the past
two years. 6
Respondent, a fifty-five year old woman, suffered from
schizophrenia and two physicians certified, in compliance with
New York Mental Hygiene Law section 9.27, 7 that she was in
need of involuntary care. 8 According to petitioner, she was
"incapable of determining the course of her medical treatment
and ... the benefits of proposed medication would outweigh the

risks of the same."9 Although respondent was raised as a
Christian Scientist, her adult observance of the religion began
only fifteen years ago. 10 About two years ago, after a gradual
decline, "she stopped practicing the Christian Science religion
completely." 11 In addition, respondent had "never sought any
assistance from" other members of her faith for her current
condition.12 Therefore, the lack of evidence of current religious
Fourteenth Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is
made applicable to the states. Rockland PsychiatricCtr., 634 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 11.6, at 397 (5th ed. 1995) (stating that the First Amendment has been
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety).
5. Rockland PsychiatricCtr., 634 N.Y.S.2d at 649.

6. Id. at 650.
7. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 1988). Section 9.27(a)
states:
The director of a hospital may receive and retain therein as a patient any
person alleged to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary care and
treatment upon the certificates of two examining physicians,
accompanied by an application for the admission of such person. The
examination may be conducted jointly but each examining physician
shall execute a separate certificate.

Id.
8. Rockland PsychiatricCtr., 634 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
9. Id.

10. Id.at 650.
11. id.
12. Id.
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observance on the part of respondent enabled the court to agree
with petitioner's contention that she had "failed to prove a valid
religious objection to the administration of medication" under the
Free Exercise Clauses of the Federal and New York State
Constitutions.

13

When true religious beliefs are demonstrated, objections to
involuntary medical treatments have been upheld because the
Free Exercise Clause "may be limited only in the face of
overriding compelling state interest[s]."14 An overriding
"compelling state interest exists only where the free exercise of
one's religion endangers, clearly and presently, the public health,
welfare or morals." 15 In Winters v. Miller,16 relied on by the
Rockland PsychiatricCenter court, the Second Circuit held that a
plaintiffs First Amendment rights had been violated, finding no
evidence "that would indicate that in forcing the unwanted
medication on [plaintiffi the state was in any way protecting the
interest of society or even any third party." 17 In Winters, the
plaintiff, a fifty-nine year old female, was involuntarily admitted
to Bellevue Hospital in New York City. 18 Over her objections,
the hospital gave her "heavy doses of tranquilizers" even though
they had clear notice that she was a Christian Scientist for about
ten years before she was admitted to Bellevue. 19 In evaluating the
evidence of her religious convictions, the Winters court noted that

13. Id. at 649.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 649 (quotation omitted). See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (holding that a state statute protecting the welfare of children by
prohibiting them from selling magazines on the streets is not a denial of the
Jehovah's Witnesses' freedom of religion); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that an outbreak of smallpox, a public health
emergency, allows the state to subject its citizens to involuntary vaccinations in
order to prevent the farther spread of the disease); Lawson v. Commonwealth,
164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942) (holding that the state may prohibit the handling of
snakes at religious services for public health and safety reasons).
16. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
17. Id. at 70.
18. Id.at 67.
19. Id.at 68.
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"there was no contention that the current alleged mental illness in
any way altered [her religious] views."20
Similarly, in In re Melideo,2 1 Judge Leon D. Lazer held that
"where there is no compelling state interest which justifies
overriding an adult patient's decision" to refuse treatment, such
treatments "should not be ordered." 22 In this case, respondent, a
childless twenty-three year old member of the Jehovah's
Witnesses who was fully competent, refused to allow a blood
3
transfusion after "she developed a uterine hemorrhage." '2
However, in allowing respondent to refuse life saving treatment,
Judge Lazer reasoned that "every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body." 24 Therefore, when a patient is not mentally
competent, life saving treatment may be ordered "even though
the medical treatment... may be contrary to the patient's
religious beliefs." 25
The Rockland Psychiatric Center court, relying on the
reasoning of Winters and Melideo, determined that there was no
"compelling state interest" in this case that required involuntary
medication. 26 However, unlike Winters and Melideo, the court
found that respondent was not mentally competent, nor capable of
determining the course of her treatment. 27 Moreover, the
respondent's mental incapacity, coupled with her failure to
demonstrate a "sincere religious belief[]," 2 8 led the court to
conclude that granting the court order for involuntary medication
20. Id. at 69. Furthermore, there was no evidence that any court had ever
determined that the plaintiff was not mentally competent. Id. at 68. Therefore,
by examining the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court, the Second Circuit,
in dicta, suggested that "even if [a patient] was found to be legally
incompetent, she nevertheless [is] entitled to refuse treatment because of her

religious beliefs." Id. at 69.
21. 88 Misc. 2d 974, 930 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).

22. Id. at 975, 930 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 974-75, 930 N.Y.S.2d at 523-24.
24. Id. at 975, 930 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (citations omitted).
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. Rockland PsychiatricOr., 634 N.Y.S.2d at 650.

27. Id.
28. Id.
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was a "narrowly tailored [treatment]... serv[ing] the best
interests of the respondent." 29

In conclusion, in order for a patient to successfully challenge
involuntary medication with psychotropic drugs under the Free
Exercise Clauses of either the Federal or New York State

Constitutions, a psychiatric patient, mentally competent and
capable of determining the course of his or her own treatment,
must demonstrate a "sincere religious belief" through evidence
showing that he or she currently practices the religion. 30 In
addition, there must be no "overriding compelling state interest"
in authorizing the treatment, such as the avoidance of a clear and
present danger to the health and welfare of others. Absent such a

showing, a court order authorizing an involuntary "narrowly
tailored treatment" in the best interests of the patient will be

granted.

29. Id. (citing Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986)). In Rivers, two institutionalized psychiatric patients
challenged involuntary medication under the New York State Constitution's
Due Process Clause. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 495 N.E.2d at 339-41, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 76-78. The court held that under the Due Process Clause, the
state may not involuntary medicate a patient with psychoactive drugs if the
patient is mentally competent. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at
81. However, the state may order involuntarily medication if the patient is
adjudged to be mentally incompetent. Id. In order to determine the appropriate
involuntary treatment if the patient is not mentally competent, "the court must
determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored... taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interests,
the benefits gained from the treatment, the adverse side effects associated with
the treatment and any less intrusive alternative treatments." Id. at 497-98, 495
N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
30. See NOWAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 4, § 17.9, at 1314 (stating that
under the Free Exercise Clause, in the context of life saving procedures, the
courts have ordered treatment where the person is mentally incompetent, "but
where the person is a mentally competent adult, there is a split among the
cases.").
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